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1 |  INTRODUCTION
There is a long tradition of preferring local theories to ones that posit lawful or causal influence at a 
spacetime distance. In this paper, we examine the reasons philosophers and physicists give in favor of 
locality.1 These reasons range from conceptual reasons (e.g., found in Newton) to methodological 
ones (e.g., found in Einstein). Here we argue against this preference. Nonlocality is scientifically un-
objectionable and nonlocal theories can be known. Scientists can gather evidence for them and con-
firm them in much the same way that they do for local theories. We argue for a deeper constraint on 
scientific theorizing and experimentation: isolation. A system is isolated (in our sense) just in case all 
 1We use ‘nonlocality’ and ‘action at a distance’ interchangeably, though see Tim Maudlin (1994) and Wayne Myrvold (2016) 
for arguments that nonlocality in quantum mechanics is distinct from action at a distance.
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Abstract
There is a long tradition of preferring local theories to ones 
that posit lawful or causal influence at a spacetime distance. 
In this paper, we argue against this preference. We argue 
that nonlocality is scientifically unobjectionable and that 
nonlocal theories can be known. Scientists can gather evi-
dence for them and confirm them in much the same way that 
they do for local theories. We think these observations point 
to a deeper constraint on scientific theorizing and experi-
mentation: the (quasi-) isolation of causal or lawful influ-
ence. We argue that this requirement ought to replace the 
locality desideratum in science. We then explore the pos-
sibility that the order of explanation has been reversed: per-
haps it is isolatable influence that determines what counts as 
local in the first place.
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of the features that have causal influence on the suitably specified ‘output’ state of the system go 
through the ‘input’ states. Consequently, scientific observations and experiments are possible so long 
as scientists must have epistemic (observational, inferential, or manipulable) access to the input and 
output states of causally (quasi-) isolated systems—regardless of whether they are local or not. We 
then explore the possibility that the order of explanation has been reversed: perhaps it is isolatable 
influence that determines what counts as local in the first place.
2 |  ARGUMENTS FOR LOCALITY
It is not entirely clear to us how many philosophers would explicitly endorse locality as a desideratum 
for science. Nevertheless, the assumption of locality, or at least the strong preference for local theo-
ries, seems to be in the background of many discussions, ranging from the debate concerning realism 
about a high-dimensional phase space,2 to quantum entanglement,3 to the metaphysical underpinnings 
of the laws of nature.4 The arguments we consider, clarify, and develop below largely represent our 
own interpretation of the motivations for assuming (or hoping for) the truth of locality. We begin with 
those we find weakest and end with those we find most powerful.
2.1 | Intuitive and experiential arguments for locality
First, consider the argument from metaphysical intuition. As P. W. Evans et al. note (2013, 305), there is a 
“[long-cherished] intuition that causation acts ‘locally’ and ‘continuously’.” The intuitive plausibility of 
locality may arise from the fact that most of our ordinary macroscopic interactions seem local: if we want 
to, say, open a door or transport some middle-sized dry goods, we have to actually touch the door and we 
must move the goods along some path. Famously, even though Hume doubts the reality of causation, he 
maintains that our idea of causation, which arises from habit or custom, requires ‘contiguity.’5
However, by attending to the details of these kinds of experiences, we see that while many of our 
quotidian interactions with the world go along an obvious path, not all do. Smells seem to permeate 
an area and are (often unfortunately) unaffected by barriers. Electrical circuits transfer information 
far faster than we can detect and thus give us no experiential evidence of their local influence. And 
magnets—at least at the level of ordinary experience—seem to attract and repel one another without 
affecting or being affected by anything between them. Thus, while some of our ordinary experiences 
seem to support locality, some, by contrast, do not.
2.2 | Conceptual argument for locality
There is evidence that Albert Einstein takes locality to be a conceptual or metaphysical requirement 
on reality. Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935, 780) claim, “No reasonable definition of reality 
 2See, for instance, David Albert (2013), Valia Allori (2013), Tim Maudlin (1994), and Alyssa Ney (2013).
 3See, for instance, John Bell (1987), P. W. Evans et al. (2013), and Huw Price (1996).
 4See, for instance, Tim Maudlin (2007), Craig Callender (2017) as well as several of the chapters in Walter Ott and Lydia 
Patton’s Laws of Nature (2018).
 5See Hume’s (1739, 12, 75) Treatise of Human Nature.
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could be expected to permit [the ‘reality’ of a second system to] “depend upon the process of measure-
ment carried out on a first system, which does not disturb the second system in any way.” It seems 
plausible that their assumption that the first system does not ‘disturb’ the second is because they can-
not discern a local path of influence. This is supported by Einstein's (1948)6 claim, “The following 
idea characterises the relative independence of objects far apart in space (A and B): external influence 
on A has no direct influence on B; this is known as the ‘principle of contiguity’.” This statement high-
lights the conceptual connection between contiguity and influence.
Similarly, Isaac Newton claims,
That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act 
upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by 
and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me 
so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent 
faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. (2004, 136)7
One way of arguing for the ‘unreasonableness’ or ‘absurdity’ of action at a distance is to look for a 
contradiction. Samuel Clarke, in his fourth reply to Leibniz, argues, “That one body should attract another 
without any intermediate means, is not a miracle but a contradiction: for ’tis supposing something to act 
where it is not.” Leibniz and Clarke (1956, 53))
We think Clarke’s worry here rests on an ambiguity. On the first disambiguation, the thing acts 
where it is not because it occurs—as a cause—where it is not. This indeed seems contradictory: trivi-
ally everything occurs where it is. But on the second disambiguation, the thing acts where it is not by 
having effects where it is not. Yet, just as plainly, on any reasonable view, an event can have an effect 
where it is not. Even purely local causes have effects in places where they do not occur—namely, in 
spatiotemporally contiguous places.8 Interestingly this observation highlights a way to distinguish 
local from nonlocal causes: local causes are contiguous (or connected by a string of contiguous pro-
cesses) to their effects while nonlocal causes are not.
A final, conceptual argument against locality points out that nonlocal causal influences allow for 
causal loops. If causes could have nonlocal, instantaneous effects, there could be causal loops at a 
single time. Or, if special relativity is correct, and if causes could have nonlocal, spacelike effects, 
there could be causal loops between distant, spacelike separated events that would allow for timelike 
loops. One might worry that such loops would lead to vicious paradoxes. We note, first, that nonlocal 
 6The original paper is in Dialectica, which Einstein included in his 1948 letter to Born. The english translation is in (1971, 
171).
 7While some authors, e.g., John Henry (2011), have objected to the popular view that Newton wanted to avoid action at a 
distance, we focus on a straightforward interpretation of this passage (as well as the Clarke passage below) in order to tease 
out possible arguments in favor of locality. See Gregory Brown (2016) for a recent analysis of some of these interpretive 
issues in which he says, “I will argue that there is overwhelming evidence that Clarke, at least, was not only strongly 
committed to the principle of passive matter, but also to the principle of local causation; I will also argue that there is at least 
some fairly strong evidence that Newton was committed to both principles and that his acceptance of the principle of local 
causation played a significant role in his rejection of unmediated action at a distance.” (2016, 40)
 8See James Clerk Maxwell (1890) for a similar argument and see the first chapter of Marc Lange (2002) for an extended 
discussion of this issue. Even in the case of electromagnetic fields—which were (at least partially) posited to preserve 
locality—Maxwell thinks there is an effect occurring where the cause ‘is not’: “If, in order to get rid of the idea of action at a 
distance, we imagine a material medium through which the action is transmitted, all that we have done is to substitute for a 
single action at a great distance a series of actions at smaller distances between parts of the medium, so that we cannot even 
thus get rid of action at a distance.” (1890, 486).
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influence doesn’t necessarily involve such loops. But if nonlocal influence did involve causal loops, 
these loops need not involve contradictions. Just as someone who receives the instructions for a time 
machine can successfully build it and travel back in time to give a copy of the instructions to her 
younger self, there are theoretical reasons to think physical systems, more generally, admit of consis-
tent solutions to the boundary conditions required for causal loops.9
We conclude that there is no contradiction involved in action at a distance.
2.3 | Relativistic argument for locality
Peter J. Lewis claims, “The reason that causal nonlocality is regarded as problematic is that causal 
locality is arguably required by special relativity.” (2016, 109) Ultimately, the world determines 
whether locality is true or not, and we are quite happy in deferring to our best physical theories. 
To be clear, our world may well turn out, as an empirical (and unproblematic) matter, to be purely 
local. But our aim in this paper is to show that we do not have pre-theoretical, conceptual, or meth-
odological reasons to prefer local theories. Here we argue that special relativity does not straight-
forwardly entail locality.
First, note that while special relativity famously puts a maximum speed limit, c, on all causal 
influences (or on signaling, depending on the formulation),10 this, by itself, does not entail that, say, 
a transmission from A to B, must be local. There could be a signal from A to B that does not move 
along any path, but that affects B only after a suitable interval—thereby respecting the universal 
speed limit. A deeper worry from special relativity is that nonlocal causation might allow for causal 
influence between spacelike separated events. Not only would this influence move faster than light 
(violating c, above), but worse, it would present us with a dilemma: assuming causes precede their 
effects, either the causal influence would allow us to discern an objective temporal ordering of 
spacelike separated events (which would add structure to special relativity), or it would make 
causation frame-dependent, with different perspectives disagreeing about which way the causal 
influence traveled.
In response to this, we point out that many philosophers refuse to stipulate that causes must tem-
porally precede their effects. The asymmetry of causation may be better explained in terms of coun-
terfactual or probabilistic asymmetries.11 Just as instantaneous action in classical gravitation does not 
allow for a time order between causally related events at an instant, nonlocal causal influence between 
spacelike separated events need not require one of these events to occur before the other. In such cases, 
causal influence will seem to flow backwards in time to some observers, forwards in time to others, 
and instantaneously to yet others. Special relativity tells us that these are equally good perspectives. 
We conclude that special relativity does not entail locality in any straightforward way.
Neither is special relativity the last word in physics. Even if special relativity required locality, it is 
not the only highly confirmed theory. Quantum mechanics is also highly confirmed. And, famously, 
quantum mechanics posits faster-than-light entanglement correlations that exhibit many of the 
 9See, for instance, David Lewis (1976) and Frank Arntzenius and Tim Maudlin (2013).
 10On one way of understanding the theory, special relativity does not rule out all kinds of influences between spacelike 
separated regions; instead, it precludes the transmission of information. For instance, in the quantum entanglement case, 
which we discuss below, Asher Peres and Daniel Terno (2004) argue that since nonlocal quantum interactions cannot transmit 
signals, they do not contradict special relativity.
 11See, for instance, David Lewis (1976).
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hallmarks of causation.12 We know this from Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen's (1935) paper, John Bell's 
proofs (see for example (1964) and (1987)), as well as from countless empirical experiments such as 
Krister Shalm et al. (2015). A straightforward interpretation of these experiments holds that the mea-
surement of one particle's state instantaneously changes the quantum state of a distant particle without 
any mediating force or field; this instantaneous change in the quantum state is explicit in some inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics (e.g. Bohmian mechanics and some versions of GRW).
One might wonder then whether the success of quantum mechanics is a straightforward counter-
example to strict requirements of locality. We would like to note that nonlocality in quantum entan-
glement has been resisted by physicists for a very long time. Likely this resistance was emboldened 
by widespread misunderstandings of John Bell’s (1964) proofs and the corresponding mistaken belief 
that locality could be preserved by rejecting local variables.
Importantly, there are also ways of preserving locality in light of quantum entanglement. For in-
stance, Huw Price (1996) shows that accepting backwards causation allows one to maintain purely 
local causal influence in a special relativistic setting.13 Finally, philosophers who offer high-dimen-
sional interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics often cite locality in 3 N-dimensional 
space as a reason to prefer those interpretations. Thus, we think it is worthwhile to critically examine 
pre-theoretic reasons for resisting action at a distance.
2.4 | Methodological argument for locality
We turn now to what we think is the most interesting argument against nonlocality—namely, that suc-
cessful scientific experimentation requires it. Albert Einstein famously assumes that local action is a 
prerequisite for the practice of science.
If [the principle of contiguity] were to be completely abolished, the idea of the existence 
of (quasi-) enclosed systems, and thereby the postulation of laws which can be checked 
empirically in the accepted sense, would become impossible. (1948, 321)
In other words, if there were effects that did not travel via a path of contiguous events, it would be im-
possible to confirm the laws of nature. For instance, a scientist might carefully set up an experiment only 
to find that unknown factors from a distance had affected the outcome in an unpredictable way. Such a 
scientist would not be able to uncover the operative laws or causal mechanisms. This can be read this as a 
kind of skeptical worry: we have to assume we are not in a world that exhibits action at a distance because 
otherwise we couldn't perform accurate scientific experiments. Or, conversely, insofar as we can perform 
successful experiments, the world must be local. Einstein seems to assume that only local components can 
appear in quasi-enclosed systems.
 12For arguments that entanglement is better thought of as involving nonseparable states than nonlocal causation, see Jenann 
Ismael and Jonathan Schaffer (2016). We think that nonseparable states—global states that cannot be reduced to the sum of 
their parts—are equally subject to the worries raised for nonlocality. For instance, what is done in one spatiotemporal region 
may yet be affected by—or counterfactually depend upon—what happens elsewhere. We suspect that nonseparability does 
not pose any distinctive worries for scientific practice, though we do not argue for that here. See also Richard Healey (1991) 
for a discussion of the connection between nonseparability and holism on different interpretations of the quantum formalism.
 13John Conway and Simon Kochen (2006) argue for another way out: if the universe is ‘conspiratorial,’ in the sense that it 
constrains the ‘allowable’ settings of the detectors that register quantum entanglement relations, the correlations can be 
explained locally.
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One reason to think that science requires locality (or that science is easier to the extent that the 
world is local) is that human scientists, as it happens, are local beings—we are restricted to the here 
and now. Chris Dorst, for instance, argues that some features of scientists, including their inability to 
access nonlocal information, ought to explicitly constrain the formulation of the laws of nature. He 
says, “The spatial and temporal locality desiderata arise because we do not typically have information 
about spatially and temporally distant events.” (2019, 16) Similarly, Craig Callender (2017, 178) ar-
gues that nonlocal theories are not as strong—in the Humean best system sense—as local ones, which 
is, “especially bad if one interprets strength in terms of usable strength for creatures like us.”
But it is unclear to us why science should be constrained by our human limitations. We cannot see 
very small things or very distant things, yet scientific instruments such as microscopes and telescopes 
have allowed us to engage in extraordinarily valuable research of the very small and very distant. We 
argue that scientific inquiry requires isolated systems, not local ones. Since most of the isolated sys-
tems we encounter are also local, it is easy to see why people have thought locality was so important 
to scientific investigation. Nevertheless, we do not think action at a distance poses any problem for 
discovering causal and lawful influence in the world. We conclude that it is a mistake to prefer local 
theories to nonlocal ones. Locality is not a theoretical virtue. In the next section we present the idea of 
isolation and explain how it can answer these methodological worries.
3 |  ISOLATED SYSTEMS
We argue that the feature of physical systems that is required for science is isolation, not locality.14 
What matters is that scientists have epistemic (observational, inferential, or manipulable) access to 
the input and output states of causally (quasi-) isolated systems.15 On our view, a system is causally 
isolated just in case all of the features that have causal influence on the suitably specified ‘output’ 
state of the system go through the ‘input’ states.16 A system is causally quasi-isolated just in case all 
of the significant and non-background causal influences go through the input states. An insignificant 
causal influence is one that makes no more than a negligible difference to the outcome (such as the 
gravitational pull of distant stars when observing the trajectory of a puck on an air hockey table). A 
background causal influence is one that is uniform throughout an experiment or observation (such as 
the temperature of the room in the same experiment). When these conditions hold, scientists are able 
to discover the lawful or causal relationships between different states. The input state can exert non-
local influences on the output, and as long as scientists are able to account for all of the significant 
and non-backgrounded components, accurate, scientific predictions can be made (and often, suc-
cessful interventions can be carried out). We provide examples that illustrate and motivate this 
account.
 14Of course, there will be many other things that are required for science. For instance, there are additional metaphysical 
requirements (such as covarying, nontrivial causal influences), social requirements (such as funding for experimental 
equipment and personnel), etc., etc. Our ‘isolation’ constraint—meant to take the place of locality—is a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition for successful science.
 15Because we are leaving the temporal direction of the experiment open, we use ‘input’ and ‘output’ where typical 
discussions use ‘initial’ and ‘final.’ Note that input conditions may include ‘non-initial’ difference-making boundary 
conditions. While we focus on the causal isolation of systems, some may wish to recast this requirement in terms of lawful 
dependencies. For a thoroughgoing discussion of the issue see Mathias Frisch (2014)).
 16One fruitful way of modeling such causal isolation is with Judea Pearl’s (2009) causal graphs. See also James Woodward 
(2003).
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3.1 | A fanciful, motivating example
Suppose, contrary to fact, astrology had turned out to be true and the distant positions of the planets 
exerted nonlocal influences on the people on Earth. If that were true, these influences could be tested 
and systematized as in any other science. For example, some astrology enthusiasts claim that their 
moods change when (and because) various planets are in retrograde. There is nothing to prevent test-
ing such an effect on moods. Indeed, according to Paul Thagard (1978, 225–226), “attempts have been 
made to test the reality of these alleged tendencies [of celestial events to affect human behavior].” 
He concludes, “through the use of statistical techniques astrology is at least verifiable.” If the theory 
were nuanced enough, we could learn of changes in the relative position of Mars by mood changes in 
people on Earth. Depending on the time delay, we might learn of those changes on Mars before we 
saw those changes in our telescopes. Crucially, those correlations would provide scientific support for 
a nonlocal, causal connection.
Note that an inability to manipulate the orbit of Mars does not preclude our ability to scientifically 
discover causal connections between the orbit of Mars and the behavior of Earthlings. Indeed, much 
of observational science—ranging from paleontology to astronomy—does not allow for the manipu-
lation of the input states of a system, nevertheless, it is possible to draw scientific conclusions about 
causal connections based on how observed (or inferred) input states evolve into output states. But, of 
course, if we developed the technology to causally affect the orbit of Mars, we could use it to produce 
mood changes via this imagined, astrological nonlocal connection.
3.2 | Quantum entanglement
Consider a case of quantum entanglement, on one of the interpretations that posits a nonlocal causal 
influence from one photon to its entangled, but distant partner.17 Scientists prepare a quantum state 
that consists of two entangled photons. When those photons hit aligned polarized filters, one will pass 
through and the other will be absorbed. Let us suppose that in this case, the left photon passes through 
its filter, exerting a nonlocal, causal influence on the right photon, which is absorbed. By assumption, 
it is the preparation of the entangled state and the left polarizer-and-photon behavior that comprise the 
input of the experiment. The right polarizer-photon behavior comprises the outcome.18
On our view, scientists need epistemic access to these input and output conditions. They achieve 
this by carefully preparing the entangled state and setting the polarizers (manipulable epistemic ac-
cess), and by observing the behavior of the photons (observational epistemic access). By isolating this 
causal process, scientists can be sure that nothing else is relevant in producing the outcome. In fact, 
improving the degree of isolation is one of the central challenges of the experiment.19 Crucially, there 
is nothing scientifically problematic about these experiments, which proceed in much the same way as 
other kinds of experiments. Even though influence is transmitted nonlocally, the theory is 
confirmed.
 17This particular interpretation of the experiment is used to show how to apply our account and does not represent our own 
views about how quantum entanglement actually works.
 18Different interpretations of the experiment will disagree about which portion of the experiment is properly counted as the 
‘input’ condition—one reason to carefully distinguish input from initial.
 19Krister Shalm et al. (2015) describe the many ways in which entanglement experiments are able to isolate the relevant 
variables from other influences.
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Interestingly, these nonlocal effects cannot be used for signaling—they show up as correlations 
which are only recognizable when experimenters from the two distant experimental apparatus meet up 
and compare notes using local processes. But we can imagine theories where information is transmit-
ted nonlocally.20 Newton's theory of gravitation is one such theory, according to which the locations 
of large, distant masses affect the motion of earthly bodies instantaneously and without any mediating 
influences.21 Such an influence could transmit information nonlocally about the locations and sizes of 
other masses. Indeed, the powerful predictions of Newton's equations, despite the posited nonlocal 
influence,22 is a testament to the excellent science that could be done in a nonlocal world.
3.3 | Global nonlocality
The entanglement example involves the nonlocal effects from specific, localized causes that never-
theless act from a distance. Now we turn to an imagined example in which there is a nonlocal effect 
from a global cause that likewise acts from a distance—where the system's input state is distributed 
across the entire universe and its causal effects do not travel by a continuous path. We argue that if 
we have inferential epistemic access to these global input conditions, we can make reliable, scientific 
predictions.
Chris Dorst provides such an example. He asks us to imagine, “Newton's second law were not 
F=ma, but instead F=mna, where n denotes the total number of particles in the universe. If that were 
the law, then we'd be out of luck, for there is presumably no way we can reliably figure out the value 
of n” (2019, 12).
Yet it seems plausible that if the total number of particles appeared in a fundamental force equa-
tion, it would be precisely the kind of number we could and would experimentally determine, in much 
the same way we actually did for F=ma.23 At first, we might view n as some kind of constant of na-
ture. But a clever scientist might realize that the ‘constant,’ n, multiplied by the average mass of a 
particle yielded a number strikingly close to estimates for the total mass of the universe. Furthermore, 
this estimate might get closer as the equation was properly weighted for different ratios of particles 
and their masses. Then, it could easily be a live scientific hypothesis that the number n represented the 
total number of particles. To take the thought experiment further, we can imagine that if the value for 
n increased at the same rate that particles were being created (perhaps by decay, etc.) it would provide 
additional confirmation for such a hypothesis.
Even though we are unable to directly observe the total number of particles, we can infer what it is 
from local observations—and the larger our sample, the more accurate our estimate. In the imagined 
 20In fact, many science fiction stories include hypothetical devices that signal faster than light, much as quantum 
entanglement would if an experimenter could control one of the experimental results. See, for example, the ansible in Ursula 
K. Le Guin’s (1974) novel, “The Dispossessed.” Setting aside relativity theory, and metaphysical issues that might arise with 
knowledge of one's own future, there is nothing scientifically problematic about these purely fictional devices.
 21See Earman (1987) for arguments that the lack of a well-defined notion of same place leads to a kind of radical nonlocality 
in Newtonian mechanics, independent of gravity.
 22While there are (local) field-theoretic formulations of classical gravitation, these formulations were developed long after 
Newton’s presentation of the theory; we are pointing out that the nonlocal Newtonian presentation involved no 
insurmountable methodological problems.
 23For similar reasons Ned Hall says, “I imagine, for example, that cosmologists would very much like to know the total mass 
of the universe—and that even approximate information about this mass would be enormously predictively and explanatorily 
valuable.” (2015, 274)
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case, it is the global ratio that matters for the nonlocal influence, so if our sample were not represen-
tative then such an experiment would miss the connection. But representativeness has nothing to do 
with locality; it is a feature of any experiment which relies on random sampling.
What makes these cases susceptible to scientific investigation is that, despite involving nonlocal 
influence, scientists can get an independent epistemic handle on the causally relevant input and output 
components—by observation, manipulation, or inference. In these cases they are discovered locally, 
but we think the examples would work equally well if our epistemic access to the input and output 
conditions were itself nonlocal (via, for instance, wormhole telescopes).
3.4 | Local non-influences
If, as we have argued, causal influences can be unproblematically nonlocal, we won't be able to dis-
cover them by looking at spatiotemporally isolated regions—any ‘isolated’ region will be free of the 
nonlocal influence by definition.24 The inverse claim here is that not every cause within a region is a 
component of interest. This is so even for influences that travel locally. Thus, a characterization of 
isolation that goes beyond spatiotemporal isolation would be needed even if all influences were purely 
local.
This can happen when some degrees of freedom for a system are causally independent of others, 
and are not coupled by law-governed connections. In these cases we can experiment on them even if 
they are within the system's local, spatiotemporal region, perhaps even co-located with other parts of 
the system. This is important because in many cases removing them would be impossible. For exam-
ple, suppose we want to predict the two-dimensional motion of a puck on an air hockey table. Since 
classical velocity variables in orthogonal directions can be treated independently, we can ignore the 
causal influences from gravity. In general, which causal influences can be ignored will depend on 
how the outcome is specified. For instance, the paint on the puck will be a local non-influencer of its 
two-dimensional motion, but not of its reflective index.
3.5 | Quasi-isolation
Typically, only some components of a system are significantly relevant to a suitably specified out-
come. Consequently, good scientific experiments cannot require total isolation. Rather, some compo-
nents have effects small enough to be ignored and others exert uniform effects that can be 
backgrounded—assuming they cannot be shielded altogether. Our ability to isolate the difference-
makers—the causally relevant features—of a system is what allows successful experimentation.25
 24Thus, isolation should not be defined in terms of spatially isolated regions. See, for example, Hilary Greaves and David 
Wallace (2014). Greaves and Wallace focus on the isolation of regions, and give an excellent physical explication of 
region-isolation. We believe that Greaves and Wallace's region-isolation is a special case of the sort of isolation we discuss. 
Similarly, Adam Elga (2007, 156) takes macroscopic locality to be an important feature of ordinary folk physics and argues 
that ‘overwhelming macroscopic locality’ is required to make fairly simple folk-physical causal models. We disagree on both 
counts. As we say in Section 2.1, a careful examination of everyday experience suggests that even folk physics is not entirely 
local and we think that ‘overwhelming macroscopic isolation’ is better suited to play the role Elga identifies in folk physics.
 25We can use Woodward’s (2003) framework to represent a quasi-isolated experiment. The significant and non-background 
causal influences are represented by endogenous variables, the insignificant influences are omitted, and the background 
influences are represented by exogenous variables that are held constant. The relevant causal influences are represented by 
structural equations between these variables and the outcome.
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There are negligible effects in the air-hockey example above. For instance, the orthogonal force of 
gravity exerts a uniform influence across the table, but it is weakly coupled with the movement of the 
puck across the table due to friction. The puck on the table does not behave in exactly the same way 
as it would in the absence of gravity—but, because friction is minimized it's close. And, unless the 
experiment requires a great deal of precision, we can ignore this influence when we perform experi-
ments on this quasi-isolated system.
We can also ignore a causal influence if it exerts a uniform influence throughout the experiment. In 
this case, the causal factor can be treated as a fixed part of the uniform background. The air pressure 
from the table is like this in our air-hockey game. Significant changes to the air pressure can change 
what happens to the puck, but provided the pressure is roughly constant throughout the experiment, 
we can ignore it.
We conclude that quasi-isolated systems are required for experimental and observational science 
to work. We must have epistemic access to input and output states of systems which stand in a causal 
relationship with one another, such that any causal influences on the output states (a) go through the 
input states, or (b) are insufficient to significantly affect the outcome of our experiment, or (c) are uni-
form and so appropriately backgrounded. None of these features require that causal relations be local, 
or require our experiment or observational study to be in a causally isolated spatiotemporal region.
4 |  WHAT IS LOCALITY ANYWAY?
Many of the examples above involve local agents discovering nonlocal laws using local methods—for 
instance, by using local communication to compare the results of distant entanglement experimental 
apparatus. But scientists operating in a nonlocal world need not be restricted to local methods. Tools 
to measure nonlocal correlations could themselves be nonlocal. We can imagine integrating such tools 
into our lives in various science-fictional ways: a nonlocal contact lens to watch concurrent storms on 
Jupiter; a nonlocal supernova detector for preparing protective shields in advance of harmful radia-
tion; a nonlocal corpora callosa to enable synchronous, bilocational adventures. Thinking in this way 
makes us wonder what agents would mean by ‘near’ and ‘far’ in such a futuristic world.26 Scientists 
with access to thoroughly nonlocal apparatus might have very different notions of distance. If causa-
tion between widely separated regions were ubiquitous, in what sense would these regions be widely 
separated?
Some philosophers argue that our notion of distance is itself dependent on our world's dynamics.27 
Here is one way of spelling this out: the strength of the various interactions of the world are repre-
sented by the world's Hamiltonian. In our world, the Hamiltonian can be factored into three indepen-
dent dimensions, and (most) interactions become weaker along these dimensions. The fact that the 
Hamiltonian can be factored this way gives rise to the appearance of a four-dimensional world (three 
spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension), and the fact that the strength of these interactions 
decreases along these dimensions gives rise to our notion of distance: one object is farther from an-
other just in case the strength of interaction between the two objects is less.
 26We assume externalism about meaning; the features of a world that make it the case that one event is some distance from 
another may not be transparent to the agent.
 27See, for instance, David Albert (1996, 282–283), Harvey Brown (2005), and Eleanor Knox (2013; 2019). Some of these 
ideas were inspired by our conversations with Marco Dees. Cf. Earman (1987, 454) who presents “(L4) T is a space-time 
theory” as a ‘pre-locality’ condition. He argues, “Without L4 it is hard to see how to make precise sense of … locality 
principles…”
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On these views, the geometric structure of spacetime emerges from an underlying dynamical the-
ory.28 And these views seem to suggest that locality holds by the very nature of the dependence: all 
interactions must be local, not because locality is a requirement or precondition of science, but be-
cause the notion of distance itself is derived from those interactions. However, such a dynamical view 
of spacetime relies on the fact that all physical interactions, including electrodynamic, strong, weak, 
and gravitational interactions, can be factored into the same four dimensions and that the influence of 
these interactions decreases in a similar way along those dimensions.
But we can imagine a world where this is not the case. If, for example, all interactions could be 
factored except one, we might think that there was an emergent spacetime, but think of the interaction 
which did not factor in this way as nonlocal on that spacetime. Provided that most interactions, in 
some sense of ‘most’, were susceptible to a unified metrical structure, our ordinary macroscopic in-
teractions and intuitive representations of the world would likely be coupled to this metrical structure; 
any remaining interaction types would appear to feature causation across arbitrary distances or causal 
processes without any path within the sensible spacetime associated with the ‘normal’ interactions.
Indeed, if wave function realists are correct about the ontology of (non-relativistic) quantum me-
chanics, it is plausible that quantum entanglement is just this sort of nonstandard interaction in a world 
which, fundamentally, is very high dimensional but whose interactions typically can be factored into 
a four-dimensional spacetime.29 According to such a picture, our everyday notions of distance are 
derived from the interaction strengths, and while most interactions turn out to be ‘local,’ importantly, 
some—such as the outcomes of quantum entanglement experiments—do not. The open possibility 
that our world is in fact a wave in a high-dimensional space whose temporal evolution gives rise to a 
mostly, but not entirely, local three-dimensional sensible world strongly suggests that even if metrical 
structure is dependent on dynamic structure, nonlocal interaction is possible and discoverable.30
A similar program in theoretical physics takes spacetime to emerge due to entanglement relations 
between nonspatial points.31 This program takes quantum entanglement to be a pre-spatial notion, and 
then argues that spacetime emerges from underlying entanglement relations. “Nearby” points are 
those with which a system is maximally entangled, but some points are also entangled with “distant” 
points that don't properly fit into a 3- or 4-dimensional mapping.
5 |  CONCLUSION
We have argued that nonlocal theories pose no problems for successful scientific practice. Nothing 
about the metaphysics of interaction, the nature of agents, or the different ways of thinking about 
distance give us any reason to doubt that science would be possible in a nonlocal world. While many 
philosophers and scientists have assumed or argued that science is easier if locality is true, we have 
argued that a more plausible requirement on scientific inquiry is isolation. As long as scientists have 
 28On spacetime-emergent views, the 3+1 dimensional spacetime in which we find ourselves arises from a deeper nonspatial 
geometry (perhaps a string landscape, causal sets, or a quantum mechanical wave function evolving in a high-dimensional 
space). On spacetime-functionalist views, the geometry of spacetime is determined directly by the dynamics of the theory, 
without any appeal to a distinct pre-spatial geometry. In both cases, it is the structure of the dynamics of the theory which 
determines the dimensionality and metric of our macroscopic spacetime.
 29See, for instance, Albert (1996), Craig Callender (2015), Alyssa Ney (2013), and Jill North (2013).
 30Thus, wave function realists cannot appeal to arguments from locality, and will have to rely on other arguments, such as an 
ontological commitment to the wave function and its corresponding high-dimensional space.
 31See Juan Maldacena and Leonard Susskind (2013) and Cao ChunJun, Sean Carroll, and Michalakis Spyridon (2017).
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independent epistemic access to the causally relevant components, they will be able to test scientific 
predictions.
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